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The authors argue that human desire involves conscious cognition that has 
strong affective connotation and is potentially involved in the determination 
of appetitive behavior rather than being epiphenomenal to it. Intrusive 
thoughts about appetitive targets are triggered automatically by external or 
physiological cues and by cognitive associates. When intrusions elicit 
significant pleasure or relief, cognitive elaboration usually ensues. 
Elaboration competes with concurrent cognitive tasks through retrieval of 
target-related information and its retention in working memory. Sensory 
images are especially important products of intrusion and elaboration because 
they simulate the sensory and emotional qualities of target acquisition. Desire 
images are momentarily rewarding but amplify awareness of somatic and 
emotional deficits. Effects of desires on behavior are moderated by competing 
incentives, target availability, and skills. The theory provides a coherent 
account of existing data and suggests new directions for research and 
treatment. 
The imaginary relish is so sweet 
That it enchants my sense. 
—Shakespeare, Troilus & Cressida, Act 3, Scene 2 
Here you are, innocently reading a psychology journal, and an article suddenly mentions someone 
drinking a cup of excellent coffee at a sidewalk café on a sunny Sunday morning. Chances are that 
you immediately imagine how good it would be to have a cup yourself. Maybe you imagine the 
smell of the freshly ground coffee beans, the smell and taste of the coffee, and perhaps even the 
sound of the grinder and the bubble and steam of the espresso machine. If you do not especially 
enjoy coffee or have just finished a cup, this image may have little appeal. But if you would really 
enjoy a cup of coffee right now, the image has a pleasurable piquancy—a tantalizing enchantment 
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that like a tickle to your foot, moves easily to a sense of torture if the desire cannot be fulfilled. 
From its inception, the thought captures your attention. It has strong emotive power, and there is a 
sense that it triggers action. You may even feel unable to continue to read this article until you get a 
cup. 
What are the essential elements of this subjective experience? Our impression is that they include 
the intrusive and often unexpected nature of the initial thought, the imagery of the coffee and of 
drinking it, and the pleasure and torture that image brings. Once begun, it is difficult to stop 
thinking about it—in fact, it is difficult to think about anything else. If the affective impact of the 
desire is particularly strong, its fulfillment may seem imperative, although of course it is not 
inevitable. 
In this article, we describe an elaborated intrusion (EI) theory of desires, which embodies these key 
aspects of the subjective phenomena as well as encompasses the wide range of related empirical 
evidence. As its name suggests, the theory distinguishes between associative processes that trigger 
intrusive thoughts about an appetitive target and the controlled processes of cognitive elaboration 
that tend to follow those thoughts that have stronger affective links. The processing priority 
provided to the elaboration is responsible for the interference with other cognitive tasks. The theory 
holds that emotive imagery and associated sensations are especially important in craving because 
somatosensory links contribute a particular piquancy and motivational power to the experience. 
Although the theory acknowledges the function of target salience in motivation (Robinson & 
Berridge, 1993), it highlights the affective nature of desires and draws attention to the duality of 
those affective reactions (i.e., the relish and torture in our article’s title). In contrast to some who 
have concluded that craving is epiphenomenal (e.g., Tiffany, 1990), we argue that desires represent 
a strong motivating force, albeit one that is moderated by other factors such as competing desires, 
skills, or availability (e.g., we want to avoid being kept awake or are out of coffee). Our theory is 
unashamedly cognitive, with a focus on human motivation, but consistent with current 
neuroscientific findings from brain imaging and animal research. 
In what follows, we define desire and distinguish it from its antecedents and consequences. We then 
provide an overview of the theory and work through its key propositions, examining the evidence 
for each, including evidence from our own laboratory. We complete the article with research 
predictions, including some implications for the treatment of dysfunctional desires. 
What Do We Mean by Desire? 
A coherent theory of desire requires clarity of definition and a distinction of desires from their 
antecedents, correlates, and consequences. It is especially important that we clarify these concepts 
because definitions have been subject to some contention, especially in the context of craving for 
drugs (Kozlowski & Wilkinson, 1987). We use desire in the sense of an affectively charged 
cognitive event in which an object or activity that is associated with pleasure or relief of discomfort 
is in focal attention. In humans it can be referred to as a conscious wish or urge to gain pleasure, 
relieve discomfort, or satisfy a want or to engage in consummatory behavior associated with these 
outcomes.1 Desire is not simply an emotion (contrast Franken, 2003), although it clearly has 
affective quality: The psychological experience includes images or verbal thoughts about the 
attractive features of appetitive objects or activities (Salkovskis & Reynolds, 1994). It is better 
described as a preference for something (an object or activity; Zajonc, 1980). Desire is also 
conscious; whereas unconscious or implicit processes may underpin some behavioral responses 
(Robinson & Berridge, 2003; Tiffany, 1990), they are not themselves desire, although they can 
trigger desire. As Robinson and Berridge (2003) argued, “when cognitive elaboration translates 
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incentive salience attributions into the level of conscious awareness of the corresponding 
representations . . . the initial activation of an implicit ‘wanting’ system contributes to the explicit 
subjective experience of a conscious desire” (p.36). 
Desires are events in time and can therefore be described on dimensions of duration and frequency 
as well as by their affective intensity. Like pain or fear, desires are direct experiences rather than 
metacognitions (cf. Toneatto, 1999), although reports or ratings are clearly metacognitive (and 
therefore subject to error). The distinction is important—brain activation patterns, for example, may 
be quite different when the person is attempting to evaluate or measure their desire rather than 
simply experiencing it. Reports of expectancies are even further divorced from the phenomena of 
desire because they represent reported beliefs about the likely consequences of target acquisition 
and do not necessarily correspond to the immediately relevant aspects of the target that are the focus 
of attention during a specific episode of desire. 
Desires are sometimes inferred from correlated self-reported phenomena such as a difficulty in 
controlling such thoughts (Bohn, Krahn, & Staehler, 1995; Tiffany, Singleton, Haertzen, & 
Henningfield, 1993; Volpicelli, Alterman, Hayahida, & O’Brien, 1992), confidence in maintaining 
behavioral restraint, or intentions to acquire the target (Tiffany & Drobes, 1991; Tiffany et al., 
1993). Although these reports may have practical utility in assessment instruments, in this article we 
separate the desires from these correlated or consequential phenomena to develop a coherent causal 
theory. A similar inferential issue is raised in animal research, in which we cannot ask for reports of 
cognition or emotion. Behavioral indices from humans and animals (consumption rate, approach 
latency, maximum reinforcement ratio, reinstatement of conditioned responses, etc.) at best 
represent indirect indices of the cognitive–emotional events (Koob, 2000; McGregor & Gallate, 
2004). Desires should also be distinguished from their antecedents such as associated cognition, 
physiological deficits, or environmental cues. The occurrence of these events may increase the 
probability of desire, but they do not represent the phenomenon itself. 
We began work on this theory as an explanation of craving for psychoactive substances. However, 
we see the theory as being applicable to all desires and argue that such a broad applicability is in 
fact essential to an adequate theory of desires and craving. Although psychoactive drugs appear to 
sensitize neural pathways involved in motivation (Berridge & Robinson, 2003; Robinson & 
Berridge, 1993, 2003), we argue that the key component processes in substance-related craving are 
the same as for other desires. Although we recognize that some people prefer to limit the use of the 
word craving to very strong or intense experiences (Kozlowski & Wilkinson, 1987), we argue for a 
continuity model of intensity and do not make qualitative distinctions between craving and desire. 
Support for a continuity across desired targets comes from various sources. Subjective reports 
indicate that the experience of desire is qualitatively similar across a range of targets, including 
food, soft drinks, alcohol, and tobacco (May, Andrade, Panabokke, & Kavanagh, 2004). Research 
into the causes, components and consequences of desire, discussed below, reveals no important 
differences between desires for different targets. Although some brain mechanisms for particular 
targets differ (e.g., thirst: Sewards & Sewards, 2000; hunger: Del Parigi et al., 2002)—as reflected 
in the differing subjective experience for specific physiological deficits—there also appears to be 
substantial commonalities in final cortical pathways. For example, dopamine antagonists attenuate 
the motivational properties of food, water, and drugs in deprived animals (Nader, Bechara, & van 
der Kooy, 1997). The mesocorticolimbic dopamine pathway appears to be particularly important in 
the action of incentives in general (Robinson & Berridge, 1993, 2003). Our article therefore 
develops a theory that aims to cover desires in general, whether these be mild or intense, for drugs 
or other motivational targets. 
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The EI Theory of Desire 
The EI theory of desire derives its title from the separation of more basic, associative processes 
from higher level elaborative processes. The associative processes underlie apparently spontaneous, 
intrusive thoughts about a target that can arise while attention is primarily directed to another task. 
They may take the form of verbal or image fragments or an implicational awareness (cf. Barnard & 
Teasdale, 1991). Elaboration involves controlled processes of search for target-related information 
and the retention of this information in working memory, resulting in highly elaborated cognition 
about the target. 
The distinction between the associative and elaborative processes is illustrated in Figure 1, with 
elements constituting the conscious experience of desire being displayed within the central box and 
triggers or sources of information being shown around it. 
The processes underpinning intrusive thoughts involve learned associations to internal or external 
antecedent events (see Figure 1). Five types of these events are distinguished: physiological deficit 
states, negative affect, external cues, other cognitive activity, and anticipatory responses to the 
target (such as salivation). The associations themselves may be classically conditioned or they can 
be semantic or episodic in nature (e.g., recall of past experiences). The nature of these initiating 
processes, indicated by the thin arrows in Figure 1, means that demands for controlled processing or 
working memory are low, and this gives rise to the sense of spontaneity and intrusion in concurrent 
cognitive activity. Although associative connections tend to reactivate instigative factors, the 
intrusive thoughts themselves are transitory events. Unless they are attended or retained in working 
memory, thoughts about the target will be vulnerable to distraction by salient stimuli or cognitive 
associates that are unrelated to the target (e.g., “a cup of coffee might be nice—my last cup of 
coffee was with Jan—I’d really like to see Jan again”). 
However, when the target elicits powerful affective reactions or a keen sense of deficit,2 we predict 
that intrusive thoughts will be followed by elaboration. We use elaboration in the conventional 
sense to mean mentally embellishing or going beyond the initial stimulus (thus elaborative 
rehearsal of a word may involve imaging its referent or thinking about how it is related to other 
stimuli or existing knowledge). The elaboration component of desire involves effortful cognitive 
processes (controlled processes) that are triggered by the intrusive thought and its associated 
affective response and are indicated by the thick arrows in Figure 1. Relevant information is sought 
and is then retained and manipulated in working memory. The search is both internal (increasing the 
salience of physiological states, episodic memories, and target-related cognition such as 
expectancies) and external (increasing the salience of relevant situational cues). Thus if someone 
spontaneously thinks “I need a cigarette” (the intrusive thought), he or she may then imagine 
smoking a cigarette, recall the last time he or she smoked, and wonder whether he or she has 
enough money to buy a pack of cigarettes. This type of cognition is what we refer to as elaboration. 
If you strongly identified with the coffee scenario described at the start of this article and it 
triggered a desire to get a cup of coffee, you were engaging in elaborative rumination. The example 
illustrates that elaborative desires do not have to wait for associations to emerge—they can also be 
elicited on instruction. Regardless of the way in which elaboration is triggered, processing resources 
tend to be captured. You may well have found it difficult to concentrate on the subsequent material 
in this article because the elaborative processing competes for priority in the limited-capacity 
systems of working memory. 
We argue that the coffee example was prototypical in its form. Sensory images are not just 
precipitants of desire but lie at its heart. Although we do not exclude the role of semantic processing 
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in desire, we predict that extended episodes of appetitive rumination will typically include the 
construction of sensory images that often are vivid and richly textured, lending the experience a 
sensory immediacy that contributes to its emotional impact and helps to explain the exquisite and 
tantalizing nature of the phenomenon. 
The generation, maintenance, and manipulation of vivid images recruits several high-level cognitive 
processes (Baddeley & Andrade, 2000). Elements of an image, including sensory information (e.g., 
the smell of beer), generic characteristics (the typical color of beer), and specific episodes (how 
good the beer tasted on holiday), are retrieved from long-term memory. This retrieval process is 
controlled by executive processes of working memory (Rosen & Engle, 1997). Relevant 
information may also be obtained from the immediate environment and stored in appropriate 
subsystems of working memory. The visuospatial and auditory subsystems of working memory 
(Baddeley, 1986) serve as workspaces for storing the information thus retrieved. Manipulation of 
this information, by modality-specific rehearsal processes and amodal central executive processes, 
contributes to the experience of vivid, quasi-lifelike images. 
We argue that progressive elaboration of the target-related thoughts, particularly in the form of 
imagery, is the key process underlying the persistence of desires during craving episodes. The 
operation of elaborative processes does not replace associative ones. Those original links remain 
activated, and their likelihood of emerging into consciousness is augmented by the increased 
attentional priority to target-relevant material. Each type of process helps to feed the other. So, the 
retrieval processes that were activated in the service of constructing an image of coffee may well 
have generated further intrusive thoughts. Response memories may also have been activated, and 
you may have started to elaborate plans for obtaining some coffee. Imagined strategies for obtaining 
coffee may include further images of it. 
This is not to say that the episode is indefinitely self-sustaining, even when pleasure and a sense of 
deficit are elicited. In the scenario at the start of this article, you may have had a cup of coffee and 
now feel sufficiently satiated that further thoughts about it no longer elicit significant affect. Other 
competing cognitive tasks may also have terminated the episode. The continued operation of 
associative processes may have diverted attention to alternative desires, or you may have been so 
enthralled by this article that you preferentially allocated processing resources to it. Both associative 
and elaborative processes contain the reasons for the termination of episodes as well as the basis for 
their development. As a result of their operation, desires tend to fluctuate in salience and affective 
intensity over time, even in the context of significant deprivation. 
We propose that imagery is particularly effective at maintaining and augmenting craving because of 
its effectiveness in activating emotional and motivational pathways. Consummatory fantasies 
provide a keen emotive edge and motivational power because of their similarity with the 
consummatory experience itself. Conversely, the physiological correlates of the affective 
experience, together with preconsummatory responses such as salivation, may lend further color to 
the sensory imagery. We predict that when other factors are controlled, a stronger sense of desire 
will be derived when the imagined experience is more closely associated with affect or is more 
subjectively vivid (Lang, 1994). More vivid imagery is likely when there are more environmental 
cues to assist its development, with the best set of cues provided by consuming a priming dose of 
the substance. For this reason, the theory is consistent with observations that a priming exposure, 
short of satiation, tends to increase rather than decrease desire (Ludwig, Wikler, & Stark, 1974). 
These aspects of desire imagery would have significant evolutionary advantages. More vivid 
consummatory images would be elicited (and more intense reinforcement obtained) as the organism 
imagined or entered a setting where the target would most likely be found. Image vividness would 
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therefore assist in selection of behavioral alternatives and in prediction of outcomes. Approaches to 
the target would both increase image vividness and increase the potency of associated affective 
responses. This would reinforce approach and preparatory behaviors to acquisition of the 
consummatory target. Vivid imagery allows the organism to continue seeking out the 
consummatory target in the temporary absence of specific cues. Imagery thereby provides a 
motivational bridge across extended time periods before a consummatory target can be obtained. 
We argue that desires make target acquisition more likely but not inevitable. Nor does the absence 
of desire preclude consumption. This is not the only route to behavior, but it is a compelling one 
that can overcome situational or intentional impedances. The impact of desire is moderated by the 
availability of the appetitive target, the balance of other salient incentives, and skills and self-
efficacy in either procuring the target or inhibiting its acquisition (Bandura, 1999). The EI theory 
predicts that when other conditions strongly favor or inhibit consumption, the level of desire will be 
less predictive of consumption than when other conditions are less extreme. So, if you are reading 
this article with an open box of chocolates at your side, intense desire is not required before you 
take one. If you are reading it in a library where eating chocolate is forbidden, even an intense 
desire may not result in an attempt to obtain it. Degree of desire is also less relevant when 
competing incentives are high (e.g., a million-dollar modeling contract is riding on loss of weight) 
and you have the self-efficacy and skills to resist consumption. Alternatively, if you feel unable to 
resist temptation or there is no reason to do so, the degree of desire for chocolate is very likely to 
predict whether you leave the house to buy some. 
Although both intrusive and elaborated thoughts appear to trigger target acquisition, they typically 
do so in different ways. Intrusive thoughts may bias choices of activities or trigger very simple 
absentminded behavior, like reaching for a cigarette, particularly when attention is focused on 
another task. Full awareness may sometimes follow that behavior rather than precede it. An 
associative linkage between focal attention to the target and a simple response is highly consistent 
with the associative processes underlying intrusive thoughts themselves. Alternatively, elaborated 
thoughts serve to maintain the desired target as a behavioral goal across temporal delays and 
provide response plans that facilitate target acquisition through the organization of behavioral 
sequences. 
Affect is involved in all aspects of the EI theory. Both intrusive and elaborated thoughts are linked 
to reward processes that confer both hedonic tone and a tendency for the appetitive thoughts to 
capture and retain attention. But the predominant emotional reaction in many episodes of desire is 
negative because negative emotion is both a potential precursor of desire and a consequence of it. 
As a precursor, negative emotion primes awareness of specific physiological deprivation, and (via 
episodic and semantic connections) it primes activities that could return the person to a positive 
hedonic state. Once a desire-related thought emerges, awareness of any associated deprivation is 
further primed. The effect is heightened in the context of expected delay or frustration of target 
acquisition and under conditions such as repeated use of psychoactive substances, where the 
pleasure or relief afforded by thoughts about the substance is increasingly rapidly subsumed by a 
strong sense of deprivation.3 When the perceived deficit is substantial, we can become caught in 
cycles of elaboration, fleeting reward, and intensified deficit as we think about the desired target. 
During a control attempt, guilt or anxiety about the intrusive thought or elaboration also contributes 
to the negative state. So the imaginary relish may be sweet, but the deprivation, guilt, and anxiety 
leave us tortured. We are like the legendary Tantalus, able to see food and drink but simultaneously 
tortured by our imagination (Drummond, 2001). 
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Components of the EI Theory and Related Evidence 
The EI theory argues that cognitive processes and desire-related cognitions intervene between the 
factors that elicit desire and attempts to consume or abstain from consumption. In the following 
section we outline the main components of the theory and relate them to existing evidence. We 
begin, conventionally, with the factors that elicit desire and then discuss our more novel distinction 
between the automatic, associative processes underpinning the experience of intrusive thoughts and 
the controlled, elaborative processes underpinning the full-blown experience of desire. We describe 
the key role that mental imagery plays during an episode of desire and show why this leads to both 
pleasure and discomfort. Finally, we address the relationship between desire and consumption. 
Factors That Elicit Desire 
As shown in Figure 1, we argue that several factors may elicit desire. These include external cues 
that have conditioned associations to thoughts about the appetitive target and associations to other 
ongoing cognitive activity. Appetitive thoughts can also follow a physiological conditioned reaction 
to an external cue (e.g., “my heart missed a beat . . . she’s here!”). A deficit state such as 
physiological deprivation or withdrawal from a substance may also elicit desire, as may aversive 
emotional states that are not necessarily related to somatic deprivation. For example, if a person has 
eaten chocolate to improve his or her mood in the past, an awareness of negative mood may be 
sufficient to trigger an association with eating chocolate, even if he or she has just eaten a hearty 
meal. 
Eliciting factors trigger desire by one of two pathways. The first is via the availability of target-
related associations in memory. These associations may be semantic, episodic, conditioned, or 
primed by previous cognitive activity. In each case, the association emerges through the 
unconscious, uncontrolled activation of memory. The involvement of learned associations 
introduces uncertainty into the prediction of whether a particular cue or train of thought will result 
in a specific desire, although the content of the thought or the salience of the cue will of course have 
an influence. So, our route home may remind us of ways we can buy alcohol, or we may remember 
the need to post a letter. Repeated elicitation of a particular desire in the context of specific internal 
or external cues would be expected to strengthen the association and increase the probability of the 
specific desire being elicited in that context, but even in that case the associative linkages still 
reflect a probabilistic relationship. 
A second pathway to desire may introduce further uncertainty to the elicitation process. In this case, 
the initial intrusive thought is of an ambiguous sensation or deficit, and there is no dominant 
association to a specific target. Under these circumstances, elaborative processes that focus on 
attribution of the deficit are likely to be initiated. This notion is consistent with an elaboration 
likelihood model of affect (Petty & Cacioppo, 1984), which proposes that a negative mood 
increases motivation to alter the current mood state, with a consequent cognitive style directed 
toward evaluating the context and searching for features that could be causing the negative mood. 
The elaboration likelihood model is strongly supported by research evidence on the impact of affect 
on cognition (Petty & Cacioppo, 1984). 
The involvement of attributional and associational processes implies that desires may arise from 
attributional errors or salient but misleading associations. An irregular heartbeat may be due to 
excessive caffeine rather than to a lover’s arrival. Within the EI theory, the desire that is elicited 
will depend on the relative salience of the appetitive target and the cognitive availability of related 
material. We predict that cross-activation of desires will be common in conditions in which 
information about the physiological deficit is ambiguous. 
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Unless a ceiling in subjective desire is reached, the EI theory predicts that multiple prompts would 
have greater effects than those occurring singly because they increase the probability of one or more 
intrusive thoughts and contribute a richer body of semantic and sensory material to elaboration. In 
fact, more than one factor may often be required for a desire to emerge at all. So, recalling a blazing 
log fire is only likely to trigger a desire to find one if we are aware that we are cold: Conversely, an 
awareness of cold will only activate a desire for fire if that associate is activated or a related 
external cue is encountered. 
Our list of eliciting factors is consistent with the existing research evidence, as is the view that the 
presence of multiple eliciting factors tends to increase the probability and strength of subsequent 
desire. The claim that eliciting factors operate via cognition in humans is consistent with evidence 
that attributional errors can occur and with demonstrations of the particular effectiveness of 
semantic and imaginal craving induction strategies. 
Physiological deficit and negative moods. There is substantial evidence that deprivation or 
withdrawal can induce desire. For example in smoking, abstinence from cigarettes for 6–24 hr is 
associated with craving, and desire to smoke is reduced by nicotine substitution (Jorenby et al., 
1996). The activation of appetitive associations during withdrawal is demonstrated by the priming 
of substance-related words (Jarvik, Gross, Rosenblatt, & Stein, 1995). Furthermore, the 
dopaminergic systems that appear to underlie incentive salience aspects of reward are differentially 
activated in situations in which animals are in deprived states (Nader et al., 1997). 
However, a single-factor model of elicitation that is based on pharmacological effects is 
inconsistent with the current data on the elicitation of craving. For example, a transdermal nicotine 
patch alleviates cigarette craving that is associated with nicotine withdrawal but does not affect 
reactivity to smoking cues (Tiffany, Sanderson-Cox, & Elash, 2000). Nor does a pharmacological 
model account for the time course of desire during withdrawal. Such a model would for example 
predict that craving for cigarettes would parallel the curve of physiological withdrawal symptoms. 
However, a steady reduction in craving over 25 days can be seen from the day people quit 
smoking—a pattern that omits an initial increase as physiological symptoms rise in severity and 
extends well beyond the primary withdrawal period (Shiffman et al., 1997). In the EI theory, the 
activation of desires during a withdrawal period is subject to the total context of target-related 
associations and to the outcomes of any attributional search that may be initiated. 
A sense of deprivation can be primed by a negative mood. So, a negative mood during withdrawal 
from cocaine is associated with more intense feelings of withdrawal than is a mood that is less 
negative (Robbins, Ehrman, Childress, Cornish, & O’Brien, 2000). In a study on smokers by 
Maude-Griffin and Tiffany (1996), a negative mood without accompanying cues resulted in 
significantly greater smoking urges than did either a neutral or a positive mood. The level of 
craving resulting from the negative mood alone was as high as that resulting from imagery about 
urges to smoke within a neutral mood context. Similar effects are seen when people with alcohol or 
cocaine dependence participate in a stressful task, whether they are seeking treatment or not (Sinha, 
Catapano, & O’Malley, 1999; Sinha, Krishnan-Sarin, & O’Malley, 1997; Sinha, Robinson, & 
O’Malley, 1998). The effect is replicable across a variety of stress-induction paradigms, including 
imagining a personalized stress situation, attempting a digit span task, or giving a videotaped speech 
(Sinha et al., 1997, 1999; cf. Droungas, Ehrman, Childress, & O’Brien, 1995). 
Research on the availability of mood-consistent information (Bower, 1992) is highly consistent with 
a negative mood making a specific deprivation more highly available. Once a negative emotional 
state either primes or is attributed to a specific deprivation, the associated targets (e.g., cigarettes) 
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are also primed. In this way, a mood-consistent retrieval effect ironically results in the ultimate 
retrieval of information with positive or appetitive associations. 
When physiological information is ambiguous, the EI theory predicts that cross-activation of desires 
(or attributional errors) may occur. Tentative support for this prediction comes from a recent study 
by Alsene, Li, Chaverneff, and de Wit (2003), who found that food abstinence increased craving for 
cigarettes (although smoking abstinence did not increase craving for food). The role of cognitive 
factors in determining the target of desire is consistent with animal research showing that 
motivational systems are not stimulus specific. Thus morphine can serve as a substitute for food 
reward in food-deprived animals (see Nader et al., 1997). The involvement of attributional 
processes in relation to physiological deficits is also consistent with smoking-related expectancies 
affecting both subjective craving and the perceived severity of withdrawal symptoms that are 
experienced during a period of nicotine withdrawal (Wetter et al., 1994). 
In contrast to the evidence on negative mood, there is little evidence that a positive mood can 
prompt craving (Greeley & Ryan, 1995). In the laboratory, effects of a positive mood induction are 
comparable to those from a neutral mood (Maude-Griffin & Tiffany, 1996). Evidence that a small 
proportion of relapses in substance control occur in positive mood states (Cummings, Gordon, & 
Marlatt, 1980) is more plausibly explained in terms of social norms relating to substance use in 
celebrations rather than as direct effects of positive moods on craving. Within the EI theory, a 
positive mood is not by itself an elicitor of desire, except when physiological arousal from another 
source is misinterpreted as being related to the appetitive target. Additive effects of positive moods 
on other eliciting factors (see below) are seen as occurring because of the accentuation of the 
pleasure or relief that accompanies desire-related thoughts (i.e., the impact of the positive mood is 
after the instigation of the cognition). 
Conditioned cues. Cues that are associated with past consumption or that signal the presence of a 
consummatory object can elicit desire, even in the absence of withdrawal or negative mood. 
Exposure to alcohol cues increases craving in both alcoholic and nonalcoholic drinkers (Cooney, 
Gillespie, Baker, & Kaplan, 1987; Kaplan et al., 1985; cf. Stormark, Laberg, Bjerland, Nordby, & 
Hugdahl, 1995), and watching someone pick up and hold a cigarette can induce smokers to crave 
cigarettes (Niaura, Abrams, Pedraza, Monti, & Rohsenow, 1992). Although much of the cue 
reactivity research has involved exposure to the sight, smell, or taste of the consummatory target, 
associations may also involve stimuli such as the time consumption usually occurs (Palij, 
Rosenblum, Magura, Handelsman, & Stimmel, 1996). They may include concurrent behaviors such 
as smoking while drinking alcohol (Burton & Tiffany, 1997). A richer set of cues or a set that is 
more strongly associated with consumption is more likely to elicit craving than are sets with weaker 
associations (Payne et al., 1992). 
Cue reactivity is usually interpreted in terms of classical conditioning, either to withdrawal 
sensations (Ludwig & Wikler, 1974) or to previous consumption (Stewart, de Wit, & Eikelboom, 
1984). A history of classical conditioning has sometimes been assumed rather than demonstrated 
(Greeley & Ryan, 1995), but there is evidence that conditioning can prompt craving. In Dols, 
Willems, van den Hout, and Bittoun (2000), smokers were shown sets of cards that depicted 
smoking cues. A random selection of cards was associated with subsequent nicotine administration: 
These cards later elicited stronger craving for nicotine than did the control cards, even though both 
sets showed smoking cues. Withdrawal responses for narcotics can also be conditioned in the 
laboratory (O’Brien, O’Brien, Mintz, & Brady, 1975), although drug agonistic effects are more 
consistently conditioned than are withdrawal symptoms (Niaura et al., 1988). 
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Recent studies have shown attentional biases toward target-related cues in substance users. Thus 
users are more likely to orient toward those cues in the environment that trigger or exacerbate 
craving. For example, smokers responded faster to probes that replaced smoking-related pictures 
than to probes that replaced control pictures (Mogg, Bradley, Field, & De Houwer, 2003), and a 
positive relationship between the strength of this bias and self-reported craving is obtained (Waters, 
Shiffman, Bradley, & Mogg, 2003). Franken (2003) argued that these attentional biases are the 
behavioral expression of dopamine-mediated sensitization of neural systems that attach incentive 
salience to drug-related cues (Robinson & Berridge, 1993, 2003). She suggested that “attentional 
focusing on drug cues may trigger more explicit cognitive processes such as positive drug-related 
expectancies and intrusive thoughts” (Franken, 2003, p. 572). In the EI theory, the intrusive 
thoughts in turn trigger cognitive elaboration that further increases attentional allocation to the 
antecedents of desire (see Figure 1). 
There is some recent evidence to suggest that a cardiovascular response by alcohol-dependent 
people to pictorial alcohol cues could be observed even when the picture was so rapidly followed by 
a masking stimulus that the picture was not consciously accessible (Ingjaldsson, Thayer, & Laberg, 
2003b). The effect was particularly seen in alcohol-dependent people who report experiencing 
higher levels of craving for alcohol (Ingjaldsson, Thayer, & Laberg, 2003a). When the high-craving 
group was exposed to masked alcohol cues they also showed a small increase in difficulty resisting 
alcohol (Ingjaldsson et al., 2003a). Together, these results suggest that preattentive 
psychophysiological responses to cues may occur and that the associational influences reflected in 
Figure 1 are not necessarily open to introspective awareness (which is why intrusive thoughts and 
associated desire phenomena feel spontaneous). 
Anticipatory responses. Among the responses elicited by environmental cues are physiological 
anticipatory responses (e.g., salivation to food or drink or increased heart rate). These responses 
generally show a low correlation with subjective desire (Maude-Griffin & Tiffany, 1996). One 
reason may be that the person is not aware of the anticipatory responses, and without such 
awareness, the desire is not elicited, even if behavioral change follows. A study by Monti et al. 
(1993) on alcoholics who were participating in detoxification found that urges to drink were not 
related to the degree of salivary response to alcohol cues. Although, among those who did have a 
salivary response, awareness of the response was associated with stronger urges. In the EI theory, 
salivation may be a consequence of desire-related cognition, but it may also be induced directly by 
conditioned associations with an external or internal cue (including thoughts that are associated 
with the appetitive target but are not directly about it). In either case, the salivation may elicit or 
enhance the desire, but in the EI theory this would occur only if the response is attended to and is 
linked to the appetitive target. For example, the person may mistakenly believe that the salivation is 
due to hunger rather than to a desire for alcohol. Our argument is consistent with a tendency for 
desire for a particular target to be elicited when that target is highly salient (Rickard-Figueroa & 
Zeichner, 1985). 
An informational model of anticipatory responses potentially allows error in the interpretation of 
internal stimuli (Schachter & Singer, 1962; cf. Lang, 1994; Marshall & Zimbardo, 1979). Such 
errors might be due to an insensitivity to physiological changes or to inattention to the sensory 
feedback, but they may also arise from misattribution of ambiguous internal states. This can result 
in responses to one appetitive object being confused with responses to another. So, responses to 
cigarette cues not only involve a rise in tobacco craving but can also involve increased desire for the 
person’s drug of choice (Taylor, Harris, Singleton, Moolchan, & Heishman, 2000). Similarly, the 
desire of cocaine-dependent people for cocaine rises to a similar extent after erotic stimuli as it does 
after exposure to cocaine-related cues (Bauer & Kranzler, 1994). In this case, responses to the erotic 
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stimuli were apparently mistaken for responses to cocaine cues. Arousal that does not arise from 
desire (e.g., sympathetic nervous system arousal associated with anxiety) can also be misattributed 
to desire. When undergraduate men were interviewed by an attractive female researcher in a study 
conducted by Dutton and Aron (1974), they were more likely to telephone the researcher after the 
experiment if they were interviewed on a high suspension bridge than if they were interviewed on a 
low bridge. Fear arousal appears to have been misattributed to sexual arousal in the presence of a 
salient erotic cue. Such effects suggest that physiological responses act in concert with cognitive 
associations rather than providing unambiguous and specific information. 
Desire-related thoughts. It is not only a matter of cognitive processes moderating the impact of 
external cues: The cues themselves can be cognitively generated. Just the knowledge of imminent 
consumption is enough to stimulate desire (Juliano & Brandon, 1998). The effect of cognitive 
associations is demonstrated by priming experiments, in which the priming of positive-expectancy 
words results in greater alcohol consumption than does the priming of neutral words (Roehrich & 
Goldman, 1995; Stein, Goldman, & Del Boca, 2000), and the priming of negative expectancies 
results in less consumption (Carter, McNair, Corbin, & Black, 1998). We argue that this change in 
behavior is likely to reflect a change in the salience of desire-related versus inhibitory or aversive 
thoughts about alcohol and, hence, in the net appetitive value of the alcohol. 
Desire-related thoughts can also be deliberately induced by semantic instructions. An instruction to 
create an image of the appetitive target is very effective at inducing craving (Cepeda-Benito & 
Tiffany, 1996; Drobes & Tiffany, 1997; Kilts et al., 2001; Maude-Griffin & Tiffany, 1996; Tiffany 
& Hakenewerth, 1991; Zwaan & Truitt, 1998). In the EI theory, the directed construction of an 
appetitive image is prototypical of elaborative desire, rather than being just another type of eliciting 
process. So, subjective vividness of imagery correlates strongly with the level of urge in the 
laboratory (Drobes & Tiffany, 1997; Maude-Griffin & Tiffany, 1996; Tiffany & Drobes, 1990; 
Tiffany & Hakenewerth, 1991). 
Berridge and Robinson (2003) suggested that “vivid cognitive images of reward, which potently 
elicit motivation, might also activate mesolimbic ‘wanting’ circuits [via] ‘top-down’ brain circuits 
involving corticolimbic projections” (p. 511). We suggest that the interactions between these high-
level brain circuits and the mesolimbic wanting circuits are likely to be two way, such that 
increased wanting leads to further imagery, which serves not only to elicit motivation and desire but 
also to maintain it. 
Simultaneous activation of eliciting factors. Unless a ceiling in subjective desire is reached, 
multiple prompts would be expected to have greater effects than would those occurring singly 
because they increase the probability of one or more intrusive thoughts and contribute a richer body 
of semantic and sensory material to elaboration. This does often appear to be the case. 
Substance-related cues usually elicit stronger craving in the context of negative emotion than when 
they appear alone, and the effect of negative emotion and cues on craving is usually additive rather 
than multiplicative (Cooney, Litt, Morse, Bauer, & Gaupp, 1997; Payne, Schare, Levis, & Colletti, 
1991; Robbins et al., 2000). This effect is consistent with negative moods and cue exposure 
operating as independent influences (as in the EI theory), rather than one moderating the other. This 
is also true of some other determinants of desire. Six hours of smoking deprivation plus imaginal 
cues had an additive rather than a multiplicative impact on craving for cigarettes in Drobes and 
Tiffany (1997), as did the combination of alcohol ingestion and exposure to smoking cues in Burton 
and Tiffany (1997). 
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Some combinations can result in factors that initially had little effect on desires acquiring an ability 
to contribute to the combination. A positive emotion, although itself an ineffective elicitor of 
craving (Greeley & Ryan, 1995), can augment the impact of substance-related imagery on craving, 
and the combined effect can be as strong as that of negative emotion (Maude-Griffin & Tiffany, 
1996; Tiffany & Drobes, 1990; cf. Taylor et al., 2000). Berridge and Winkielman (2003) reported 
that participants exposed to subliminal affective faces did not report any change in mood, those 
exposed to happy faces drank more of a freely available soft drink, and those exposed to angry faces 
drank less, but only if participants were already thirsty. Within the EI theory, a positive mood 
would accentuate the ability of the appetitive thought to elicit reward because the positive emotion 
would share hedonic tone with the liking aspect of reward (Robinson & Berridge, 1993, 2003). 
There is also evidence that the presence of craving then modifies the emotional context by drawing 
attention to deprivation (“sense of associated deficit” in Figure 1). Ongoing smokers who imagined 
a positive emotional scene in a study by Maude-Griffin and Tiffany (1996) had a less positive 
emotional response when the scene included smoking images than when it omitted them. 
Conversely, inclusion of an urge component in a negative emotional context also blunted the 
negative mood. 
Distinction of Associative and Elaborative Processes 
The distinction between the processes underlying intrusive and elaborated thoughts is similar to the 
distinction of automatic and controlled processing, which has a long history in cognitive psychology 
(Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977). It is also similar to Stacy’s (1995, 1997) distinction between memory 
associations and explicit introspections about expectancies, although it incorporates broader 
perspectives on the nature and origins of both phenomena. By using the term intrusive thought, we 
deliberately infer a parallel with similar phenomena that occur in a negative affective context, such 
as in anxiety or posttrauma reactions (Tunis, Delucchi, & Hall, 1994). 
In contrasting intrusive and elaborated thoughts, we emphasize that it is the underlying processes 
rather than the contents of the cognition that we are contrasting. Whereas the process of elaboration 
provides an opportunity for the assembly of complex and highly articulated informational 
composites, an associative process may lead to a cascade of data that is similar to the content that is 
retrieved by directed search. For example, recall of an episodic memory may be triggered 
involuntarily by a sequence of associations or deliberately by directed search. Nonetheless, there is 
some evidence from self-report studies, discussed below, that people can distinguish subjectively 
between spontaneous thoughts that apparently trigger desire and images that are a key element of 
the desire itself. 
The distinction between intrusive and elaborated thoughts is critical to developing an understanding 
of the initiation and impact of desire. Elaborated thoughts can be derived in response to instruction 
(as in the image at the start of this article), by initiating target-related search and retention 
processes. However, we contend that intrusive thoughts represent a more typical gateway to 
ruminative episodes and that they continue to be elicited throughout those episodes. It is intrusive 
thoughts that mediate the experience of sudden, unexpected yearning for a cigarette years after 
people stop smoking. Evidence that intrusive thoughts do often form a gateway to episodes of 
craving was obtained by our research group in a study based on a questionnaire given to prospective 
university students about the triggers and experience of a current craving for food, tobacco, soft 
drink, or alcohol (May et al., 2004). Of a list of potential triggers, “I suddenly thought about it” was 
rated jointly at the top with “I felt hungry/thirsty/tired/physical discomfort.” 
If intrusive thoughts almost inevitably lead to elaboration and if the process of elaboration then 
elicits additional associations, can a practical distinction be made between the two? We argue that 
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such a distinction can be made and that it is an important one. We predict that under some 
circumstances intrusive thoughts only have a fleeting impact on attention or attract only partial 
awareness. This is likely to occur when competing cognitive demands are substantial, especially if 
successful performance of the concurrent task has a high incentive value—for example, a 
momentary sensation of hunger during a public speech may soon be forgotten. Such fleeting 
attention will be more likely when there is a low level of deprivation or need or weak associations 
between the thought and affective and motivational systems (e.g., “Some carrots right now would 
be quite pleasant”). We would expect that these events would not be highly salient in memory but 
that people would be able to report on their occurrence as long as the report was proximal to the 
event. Self-report evidence in support of the phenomenon of fleeting intrusions is being provided by 
a current study we are conducting on people with alcohol misuse who are trying to reduce their 
drinking. Preliminary data from 49 participants showed that 92% reported experiencing at least 
some thoughts about drinking in the previous 24 hr that “just pop in and vanish” without an attempt 
to eliminate them. This suggests that fleeting intrusions may be a common phenomenon, even in the 
context of substance misuse. 
The distinction between intrusive and elaborated thoughts also has importance for attempts at 
control. We propose that obsessive craving or desire (Anton, 2000)—in the sense of unwanted, 
intrusive appetitive thoughts—is a general feature of desire and its attempted suppression, rather 
than a phenomenon that is restricted to particular individuals. Suppression of a thought that has 
appeared in awareness should at best be ineffective because the intrusiveness of such thoughts is 
actually accentuated by the attempt (Lavy & van den Hout, 1990). Following Wegner (1994), we 
argue that the phenomenon occurs because of two parallel processes. On the one hand, distraction 
requires a high level of cognitive effort, and this effort is difficult to maintain in the face of 
competition for cognitive resources. On the other hand, the monitoring of violations, which requires 
fewer cognitive resources, activates desire thoughts (e.g., “Have I thought of alcohol yet? Oh no, I 
have now”). Furthermore, the detection of cognitive violations often leads to negative self-
appraisals (e.g., “I’m so weak and disgusting to be thinking that”) and reduced self-efficacy about 
control of thoughts and behavior. The resultant distress then intensifies a bias toward deficits and 
triggers further intrusive thoughts. The monitoring of violations in desire control is therefore 
another initiator of desire and ironically undermines the very control that is attempted. This is not to 
say that control of desire cognition is impossible. People can preempt intense episodes of desire by 
controlling potential triggers, for example, by avoiding situations that are rich in conditioned cues 
and maintaining positive mood. They may also engage in alternative pleasurable activities that 
command attention. Such strategies mean that people do not have to be totally at the mercy of their 
own associative processes (Bandura, 1999). 
Associative effects on cognitive tasks. Our dual-process view of craving suggests that two different 
types of cognitive phenomena should be demonstrable. Effects of priming or activation of target-
related networks should arise from the implicit or automatic associative route to desire. Interference 
with other demanding cognitive tasks should arise because the directed search and retention in 
elaboration requires limited cognitive resources. Some priming may of course occur because of 
increased exposure to target-related stimuli by users of a substance versus nonusers (e.g., Stacy, 
1995). Increased priming during periods of subjective craving or deprivation provides stronger 
evidence of automatic cognitive processes. Such priming or activation is indicated by evidence that 
the lexical processing of smoking-related words is enhanced after overnight abstinence from 
smoking (Jarvik et al., 1995). Similarly, Aarts, Dijksterhuis, and De Vries (2001) showed that 
thirsty participants responded faster to drinking-related items in a lexical-decision task than did 
participants who were not thirsty. An increased availability of substance-related associations in the 
context of either overnight cigarette deprivation or an attempt to quit smoking was also 
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demonstrated by Phillips, Kavanagh, May, and Andrade (in preparation). In response to a request to 
generate words about relaxation, more smoking-related words were obtained from deprived or quit 
smokers than from either nonsmokers or nondeprived smokers. There is some evidence that the 
number of memory associations generated in response to drug-related stimuli predicts subsequent 
drug use and does so independently of a measure requiring elaborative processing (explicit 
expectancies; Stacy, 1997). 
A commonly used paradigm involves a modification of the Stroop color-naming task. Overnight 
smoking deprivation results in impeded color naming of smoking-related words (Gross, Jarvik, & 
Rosenblatt, 1993), and food deprivation has similar effects on food words (Channon & Hayward, 
1990; cf. Lavy & van den Hout, 1993). This may reflect priming or possibly attentional changes 
that direct processing toward desire-related stimuli. 
Evidence from cognitive tasks on elaboration. Studies on concurrent cognitive tasks are consistent 
with our contention that the elaboration of desire-related thoughts engages considerable cognitive 
resources and therefore impairs performance on other tasks that compete for these resources. 
Because focal attention is one of the tasks that draws on limited working memory resources, an 
attentional task that is unrelated to the desire should be impaired by concurrent desire-related 
elaboration. So, probe reaction time is slowed during cue exposure with smokers (Cepeda-Benito & 
Tiffany, 1996; Sayette & Hufford, 1994), alcoholic patients (Sayette et al., 1994), and opiate addicts 
(Hillebrand, 2000). Probe reaction times in participants who are both substance deprived and 
exposed to related cues are significantly associated with the level of craving after the task (Green, 
Rogers, & Elliman, 2000; Sayette & Hufford, 1994; Sayette et al., 1994). Longer probe reaction 
times are also associated with the perceived frequency of obsessive thoughts about the substance in 
the previous week (Franken, Kroon, & Hendriks, 2000), indicating that people are often aware of a 
cognitive impact from substance-related intrusive thoughts and their elaboration and (because 
obsessive thoughts tend to be resisted during a control attempt) that such cognitive interference is 
probably made worse by the effects of attempted thought suppression. 
Cognitive impairments are not restricted to speed of reactions to probes but occur on a wide range 
of tasks requiring sustained attention or working memory. For example, an imaginal urge induction 
in ongoing smokers impaired the accuracy of reading comprehension, particularly on more complex 
sentences and in participants with a low reading span (Zwaan & Truitt, 1998). Although 
mathematics performance was not impaired when heavy drinkers were exposed to alcohol-related 
cues in Bradizza, Lisman, and Payne (1995), that study tested only college students (who 
presumably had moderate to high mathematics ability) and confounded a positive emotion induction 
with cue exposure. 
In summary, the evidence on cognitive tasks suggests that desires alter the ability of external cues to 
activate associated cognitions and conscious allocation of attention to target information. 
Furthermore, extended episodes of desire appear to take up resources in limited-capacity systems of 
working memory and thereby interfere with the performance of other tasks that compete for this 
capacity. The EI theory captures this phenomenon, placing elaborative imagery processes at the 
heart of desire. 
Evidence for intrusive thoughts from attempts to inhibit them. When people are trying to inhibit the 
acquisition of appetitive targets, desire-related thoughts often resemble obsessional thinking 
(Modell, Glaser, Mountz, Schmaltz, & Cyr, 1992). The parallels include the intrusive quality of the 
thoughts, the difficulty in banishing them from awareness, and their tendency to produce distress 
(Modell et al., 1992). There are also parallels on a neuroanatomical level, with similar brain 
structures being activated in people with a preoccupation with craving as in obsessive–compulsive 
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disorder (OCD; Ciccocioppo, 1999; Grant et al., 1996; Volkow & Fowler, 2000). Although the 
intrusive quality of desires and urges partly derives from their association with pleasure and 
discomfort, particularly in the context of deprivation or withdrawal, another potential source of 
intrusion comes from attempts to suppress the thoughts. Although there is evidence that recall can 
be inhibited by prior practice of recall suppression (Anderson & Green, 2001), very different effects 
are obtained from suppression of highly available material that has already been retrieved. Even the 
suppression of nonemotive thoughts is a very difficult enterprise that can usually only be 
accomplished for short periods when other cognitive demands are low (Wegner, 1994). Attempts at 
suppression typically produce higher frequencies of the thought either during (Lavy & van den 
Hout, 1990; Merckelbach, Muris, van den Hout, & de Jong, 1991; Salkovskis & Campbell, 1994) or 
after the attempted suppression (Clark, Ball, & Pape, 1991; Clark, Winton, & Thynn, 1993; A. G. 
Harvey & Bryant, 1998). Distraction from emotive thoughts can however reduce the emotional 
response—at least in depression (Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1993). 
There are very few studies on suppression of appetitive thoughts. In a study of heavy drinkers by 
Palfai, Monti, Colby, and Rohsenow (1997), participants who were instructed to suppress urge-
related thoughts were significantly faster at judging the personal relevance of alcohol expectancies, 
suggesting that these were more cognitively accessible. Salkovskis and Reynolds (1994) examined 
the effects of thought suppression in smokers asked to monitor smoking thoughts, to suppress 
smoking thoughts, or to combine suppression and breathing exercises (relaxation). The relaxation 
instructions resulted in a lower frequency of smoking thoughts both during and after the task than 
did the other two conditions. Those in the monitoring group, who did not suppress smoking 
thoughts, had a lower frequency of the thoughts than those in the suppression group. 
Although attempted suppression of desire-related thoughts is counterproductive, attention diversion 
without suppression may have some success. When external constraints mean that consumption is 
expected to be delayed, people sometimes initiate strategies to reduce the discomfort associated 
with unsatisfied desires (e.g., by diverting their attention from the cues). These strategies still 
require cognitive resources. When smokers believed they would have to wait 3 hr for a cigarette in a 
study by Juliano and Brandon (1998), exposure to smoking cues did not significantly increase their 
immediate subsequent level of craving but did increase their reaction time to auditory probes. In 
contrast, a group who believed they could smoke within 20 min showed an effect of smoking cues 
on immediate subsequent desire but no increase in probe reaction time. Even in continuing users, 
attempted control of desire is likely to be temporary or be affected by other tasks. So, a second 
rating of desire after the cognitive task showed effects of smoking cues that were of similar 
magnitude in both groups. Not only was the competing cognitive task affected by the attempt to 
control desire, but also apparently, it impeded that attempt. 
In summary, the evidence on thought suppression in desire is that as in other kinds of intrusive 
thoughts, the attempted suppression of desire exacerbates its intrusiveness. In the EI theory, 
monitoring suppression increases the availability or salience of intrusive thoughts. An alternate 
strategy is needed to reduce this salience and the resources available for subsequent elaboration. 
Neuroimaging studies. Patterns of brain activation during episodes of craving provide further 
evidence that is consistent with a distinction between associative and elaborative processes. A 
neuroimaging study of craving by Grant et al. (1996) used paraphernalia related to cocaine use to 
elicit craving in cocaine abusers and compared the resulting changes in glucose metabolism with a 
control condition (arts and crafts paraphernalia) and with control participants who did not use 
cocaine. Grant et al. noted that all the regions that responded to the drug paraphernalia in cocaine 
users are associated with memory. Regions associated with differences between conditions or with 
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increased levels of craving were those associated with working memory (dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex), explicit episodic memory (dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, medial orbitofrontal cortex, 
retrosplenial regions of the limbic cortex, parahippocampal gyrus, and the cerebellum), and 
emotional expression or facilitation of memory encoding following emotional arousal (amydgala). 
The involvement of working memory and long-term memory areas is consistent with our contention 
that cognitive elaboration is a key component of craving. 
Grant et al. (1996) suggested that the observed increase in orbitofrontal activity reflected intrusive 
thoughts. This interpretation is consistent with the activation of this same region in patients with 
OCD (Saxena, Brody, Schwartz, & Baxter, 1998; Zald & Kim, 1996). Grant et al.’s study therefore 
observed an activation of brain regions that was consistent with the occurrence of intrusive thoughts 
and elaborations. Subsequent neuroimaging studies have broadly replicated the finding that craving 
cues activate prefrontal and orbitofrontal regions associated with working memory, long-term 
memory, and intrusive thoughts (Bonson et al., 2002; Daglish et al., 2001; George et al., 2001; 
Maas et al., 1998; Posse et al., 2001). These findings are consistent with our hypothesis that desire 
involves cognitive elaboration, involving consciously directed retrieval of information from long-
term memory and manipulation of that information in working memory as well as associative 
processes leading to intrusive thoughts. However the interpretation of data from neuroimaging 
studies clearly involves inferences about correlated activations rather than direct tests of the 
distinction between intrusive and elaborative processes, and the time resolution of current 
neuroimaging procedures is insufficiently short to capture relatively transient phenomena unless 
they are repeatedly activated. 
Imagery Is a Key Type of Desire Cognition 
We propose that a key and neglected feature of elaboration in desire is the development of images 
or fantasies about the consummatory target or experience or about the expected effects of 
consumption. In making this claim, we emphasize that such images are not restricted to visual 
content—in fact, some of the most powerful images may involve smell, taste, touch, or hearing. 
Although we acknowledge that verbal desire-related thoughts also occur, we argue that imagery is 
central to the naturalistic experience of most if not all of the more intense craving episodes. When 
people have the thought “what I would do for a log fire right now,” we argue that it is not the 
propositional meaning of that sentence that makes their skin tingle and captures their attention. It is 
features that the thought elicits that seem more closely linked to our appetitive emotional reaction—
the warmth of the fire, the smell and crackle of the logs, or perhaps the vision of our lover in the 
dancing firelight. Even in cases in which we encounter powerful environmental cues such as the 
wafting smell of freshly baked bread, we elaborate those cues internally, imagining the sight, 
texture, or taste of the bread. Subsequent responses are more to the elaborated image than to the 
simple cue. 
We know that imagery is a very effective means of eliciting craving (e.g., Green et al., 2000; 
Tiffany & Drobes, 1990) and that the vividness of an imagined urge-induction scene is positively 
correlated with the strength of the craving thus induced (K. Harvey, Kemps, & Tiggemann, in 
press). There is some self-report data showing imagery during craving in naturalistic settings, but 
there has been no systematic study of desire imagery per se. Neuroimaging studies could potentially 
help to test the hypothesis that imagery typically occurs in craving, by showing activation during 
craving of brain areas associated with mental imagery tasks. We would expect that sensory images 
during craving would be associated with activation in similar areas to those activated in comparable 
types of imagery in the same sensory domain (e.g., Belardinelli et al., 2004; Handy et al., 2004; 
Knauff, Kassubek, Mulack, & Greenlee, 2000; Mazard, Tzourio-Mazoyer, Crivello, Mazoyer, & 
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Mellet, 2004; Parsons, 2003). Visual craving imagery would also be expected to recruit areas that 
overlap with those required for other visuospatial working memory tasks (Henson, 2001). However, 
existing neuroimaging studies on craving have typically used visual stimuli or imaginal cues in both 
the craving and neutral conditions, giving little scope for detecting differential activation of imagery 
regions during craving. Our imagery hypothesis could be tested by future studies of craving effects 
on brain activation during performance of tasks with minimal visual or imagery content. 
Self-report data. Smokers in a study by Salkovskis and Reynolds (1994) reported that imagery 
formed an important component of craving. Images of “yourself under stress, having a cigarette to 
help calm down or cope” or “yourself in a relaxed place, enjoying a cigarette” were among the most 
frequent and intense smoking-related thoughts. In Westerberg’s (2000) study, responses to 
questionnaire items referring to taste imagery were significantly associated with alcohol craving. 
Our ongoing study on people in an outpatient treatment program for alcohol misuse (referred to 
above) is finding that visual as well as taste imagery is emerging as a common feature of desire for 
alcohol but that sounds and smells are experienced by only a minority of participants. Imagery is 
not restricted to alcohol. Our research group has found that reports of imagery (e.g., “I am 
visualizing it”) are commonly reported during craving for a range of substances, including foods 
(May et al., 2004). 
Interference with imagery. Other recent studies support our hypothesis that mental imagery is a key 
component of craving by showing that unrelated imagery tasks reduce craving. A study by 
Panabokke, May, Eade, Andrade, and Kavanagh (in preparation) induced craving by asking 
smokers to abstain from smoking prior to coming into the laboratory and then to read a 
multisensory urge-induction script. A control group smoked ad lib until arriving at the laboratory 
and then read a multisensory neutral script. Participants rated their craving for cigarettes, then 
formed visual or auditory images in response to verbal cues (e.g.,  “a game of tennis,” and “a 
telephone ringing,” respectively), and again rated their craving after each of three blocks of six 
imagery trials. Craving in the abstaining smokers was reduced to the control group’s level by visual 
imagery and by auditory imagery paired with a dynamic visual noise display known to disrupt 
imagery but not by auditory imagery alone. 
K. Harvey et al. (in press) replicated this study with a sample of dieters and nondieting control 
participants. Participants imagined a food-related or control (holiday) scene and then performed 
three blocks of six imagery trials, as in Panabokke et al.’s study. For dieters and nondieters, the 
visual imagery task reduced craving more than the auditory imagery task, but this was the case only 
following the food-related induction scenario. The urge-induction scenarios used in both studies 
were intended to be multisensory so that any interference effects should not be attributable to the 
use of visual imagery to induce craving. Nonetheless, there is a need to replicate these findings 
without the use of an imagery task to induce craving. 
Kemps, Tiggemann, Woods, and Soekov (2004) asked dieting and nondieting women to form 
images of food-related and nonfood items, to rate the vividness of their images, and to rate their 
level of craving for food. Food-related images were associated with higher craving ratings than 
were the nonfood images. Concurrent visuospatial tasks known to disrupt visuospatial imagery and 
working memory reduced the vividness of all images and, for the food-related images, reduced the 
associated level of craving. These studies thus show that interfering with visual imagery reduces 
craving, a finding consistent with our hypothesis that imagery is a key cognitive engine in craving. 
Imagery and emotion. There is evidence that mental imagery taps many of the cognitive (Kosslyn, 
1994) and brain processes used in perception (Klein, Paradis, Poline, Kosslyn, & Le Bihan, 2000; 
Kreiman, Koch, & Fried, 2000; O’Craven & Kanwisher, 2000; Wheeler, Petersen, & Buckner, 
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2000; Yoo, Freeman, McCarthy, & Jolesz, 2003). We suggest that activation of these processes 
triggers qualitatively similar emotional responses, regardless of whether the stimulus is perceived or 
imagined. There is evidence that imagery and emotion are closely linked. Imagining emotive 
memories or situations induces physiological changes indicative of heightened affect (Bywaters, 
Andrade, & Turpin, 2004b; Witvliet & Vrana, 1995). Intrusive imagery in posttraumatic stress 
disorder is characterized by high levels of arousal during the imagery period (Witvliet, 1997), and 
patients’ images are particularly associated with memories of peak emotional distress during trauma 
(“hotspots”; Holmes, Grey, & Young, in press). Very recent research suggests that imagining 
(rather than verbally processing) negative situations leads to greater increases in state anxiety 
(Holmes & Mathews, 2004). There are indications that similar links between imagery and 
emotional arousal are also seen in desires: For example, imagining and describing experiences of 
craving induces increased systolic blood pressure and an increased heart rate during abstinence 
from opiate use (Weinstein, Wilson, Bailey, Myles, & Nutt, 1997). 
Mental images that are rated as more vivid tend also to be rated as more emotive and arousing 
(Bywaters, Andrade, & Turpin, 2004a). Interfering with images of emotive scenes or memories by 
means of concurrent cognitive tasks leads to reductions in the rated emotional response to the 
images as well as reduced image vividness (Andrade, Kavanagh, & Baddeley, 1997; Kavanagh, 
Freese, Andrade, & May, 2001; van den Hout, Muris, Salemink, & Kindt, 2001). 
In summary, there is empirical support for our claim that imagery is central to craving. Imagery is a 
common feature of the subjective experience of craving, and manipulations of imagery affect 
craving. Imagery of emotional scenes is associated with emotional responses, consistent with our 
argument that imagery, and elaborative processing more generally, triggers the emotional changes 
that characterize episodes of craving. The emotional aspects of desire are discussed next. 
Desires Involve Both Pleasure and Discomfort 
We argue that reward-related processes are critical both to the initiation and maintenance of 
appetitive rumination. Initial thoughts about the consummatory target generate some of the same 
neurochemical processes and physiological sensations that are related to ingestion of the target 
substance or engagement in the target activity (albeit in a weakened or partial form). The response 
may be heightened by generalized pleasurable arousal or by anticipatory physiological responses 
(such as salivation). In cases in which a strong sense of deprivation is present, the EI theory predicts 
that a transient and partial relief from the perceived discomfort is initially experienced. In situations 
in which deprivation is less severe or the stimulus is particularly attractive, the experience is 
predicted to be initially pleasurable. Neurochemical processes and brain pathways that underlie 
positive and negative reinforcement may well have significant differences (Verheul, van den Brink, 
& Geerlings, 1999), but within the EI theory they have a common function—immediately 
increasing the salience of the thought and reinforcing attention to it. Each successive elaboration 
initiates a further burst of this positive activation, and more articulated imagery improves the match 
of the experience to the actual activity, intensifying the momentary sense of pleasure or relief. 
Continued rumination is thereby reinforced. 
However, awareness of pleasure or relief also draws attention to other aspects of somatic states. The 
partial and fleeting nature of the reaction and the fact that any preexisting physiological deficit has 
not been relieved are then in focal awareness. The positive sensation soon dissipates, but the 
sensations from the physiological deprivation remain available. Thus, the initial positive reaction 
reinforces elaboration, but a renewed and strengthened sense of deprivation then follows. The 
immediate and intensified relief afforded by elaborated imagery continues to motivate further 
search, despite a keen sense that the previous image was no substitute for the real thing. 
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Within the EI theory, the overall affective response to the desire or urge experience is expected to 
be positive or pleasurable only in situations in which there is no significant deficit state, because the 
aversive content of that state would otherwise dominate the experience. For this reason, a delay (or 
even the expectation of delay) turns an initially pleasurable desire into a highly aversive craving. 
The extent of delay that would produce such an aversive effect would be predicted to be shorter in 
cases in which deprivation was more severe or substance dependence was more marked. 
Neuroimaging studies. Data from imaging studies are consistent with the notion that desires involve 
affective reactions. Desires are associated with activation of limbic regions that are associated with 
emotional processing and reward, such as the amygdala and anterior cingulate gyrus (Childress et 
al., 1999; Daglish et al., 2001; Del Parigi et al., 2002; Kilts et al., 2001; Maas et al., 1998; Posse et 
al., 2001). Selective anterior cingulate activation in response to drug cues precedes subjective 
reports of craving (Wexler et al., 2001) and is reduced by treatment for drug dependency (Schneider 
et al., 2001). These systems are common to other emotional situations. Thus Kilts et al. (2001) 
replicated the finding of increased amygdala activation following a personalized craving script 
rather than following a neutral script but found that amygdala activation did not differ significantly 
between the craving condition and a personalized anger script, suggesting that it reflects general 
emotion changes that are not specific to craving. Garavan et al. (2000) used functional magnetic 
resonance imaging to study 13 putative craving sites. Only 3 of these sites—anterior cingulate, right 
inferior parietal lobe, and caudate–lateral dorsal nucleus—showed greater activation in cocaine 
users watching a cocaine film than in cocaine users watching a sex film. Garavan et al. argued that 
the neural substrates of cocaine craving are the same as those of normal responses to evocative 
stimuli. Their findings, and those of Kilts et al. (2001), are consistent with the view that craving and 
desire in general are part of a continuum of phenomena generated by normal cognitive–emotional–
motivational systems. 
Pleasure and relief. Desires are pleasurable when consumption is imminent. Just thinking about 
prospective consumption clearly is pleasurable when there is no significant delay before 
consumption and there are no immediate concerns about negative effects from it (Zinser, Baker, 
Sherman, & Cannon, 1992). Although craving can be accompanied by physiological signs of 
withdrawal (Wikler, 1973), more consistent parallels between physiological cue reactivity and 
agonistic substance effects are seen (Drobes & Tiffany, 1997; Niaura et al., 1988; Stewart et al., 
1984). The existence of internal reinforcement for craving is supported by associated activation of 
mesocorticolimbic dopamine reward pathways in the brain that are also activated by ingestion of 
most psychoactive substances (Koon, 1992; Stewart et al., 1984; Wise, 1996; cf. Robinson & 
Berridge, 1993, 2003). One suggested mechanism for an effect of naltrexone on alcohol craving is 
that it may blunt the pleasurable effects from imagined consumption (Verheul et al., 1999) as well 
as the effects of actual consumption. In the case of alcohol, there is also evidence for rises in the 
excitatory transmitter glutamate in the context of a conditioned cue—an effect that is likely to feed 
not only into memory systems but also into the emotion and reward systems (De Witte, 2004). 
The existence of a reward mechanism for desire-related thoughts helps to explain the puzzle about 
why people would otherwise dwell on these thoughts, even though they ultimately feel dissatisfied 
and even tortured by the experience. This same mechanism may be the one responsible for 
expectancy effects from consumption. If a person with alcohol dependence has a drink they believe 
is alcohol, craving for alcohol is triggered, whether or not alcohol was actually present in the drink 
(Laberg, 1990; Ludwig et al., 1974). In fact, Ludwig et al. (1974) found only a differential increase 
in craving after alcohol when people were told they had received alcohol (cf. Stockwell, Hodgson, 
Rankin, & Taylor, 1982). This suggests that when the pharmacological effects of the substance are 
sufficiently weak or are easily confused with concurrent emotional reactions, the reward that is 
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triggered by imagined sensations can have a more powerful influence on craving than can the 
pharmacological effects of consumption. Similar effects can occur with relief of deficit states. The 
oral administration of methadone during the first 3 days of withdrawal from narcotics relieves 
withdrawal symptoms (Dawe & Gray, 1995), but the onset of symptom relief is too fast for a direct 
pharmacological effect of oral methadone, demonstrating that expectancies affect the perception of 
withdrawal. Such results are inconsistent with a neurochemical model of craving that sees 
cognitions as purely epiphenomenal but are consistent with reward or relief from perceived or 
imagined ingestion. 
As already discussed, Robinson and Berridge (1993, 2003) see the mesocorticolimbic activation 
during craving after repeated use of a psychoactive drug as a reflection of nonhedonic incentive 
salience. In terms of the EI model, increased incentive salience would tend to increase the 
probability of intrusive thoughts (by increasing the attentional priority of the instigating factors in 
Figure 1). When incentive salience is strongly developed, it is conceivable that the number and 
attentional priority of associations would be sufficient to trigger elaboration even in the face of 
competing task demands, even if the affective component of the thought was reduced or eliminated. 
However we argue that the continued involvement of limbic structures implies a continued affective 
component to the desire and that the presence of this component continues to exert an influence on 
elaboration even when incentive salience is highly developed. 
Rather than all affective responses to thoughts about psychoactive drugs being eliminated over the 
course of repeated drug use, there is a progressive move from positive to negative reinforcement 
over time (Robinson & Berridge, 1993, 2003), together with an increased tendency for the desire to 
accentuate a sense of deprivation. During this process, we argue that the affective accompaniment 
to desire becomes increasingly ambivalent and the quality of the positive component becomes 
increasingly characterized by relief rather than pleasure. This change to relief may implicate some 
different neural pathways than are seen in pleasure (Stewart, 2000), but we argue that the role of 
pleasure and relief in our theory is the same—hence the presence of both within a single box in 
Figure 1. 
Aversion. Desires are particularly aversive in extended deprivation or attempted control. When 
consumption has to be substantially delayed or there is potent current motivation not to consume the 
substance, the predominant emotional response to craving is negative (Cooney et al., 1987; Zinser 
et al., 1992). The effect has been demonstrated with a wide range of consummatory targets 
including alcohol (Cooney et al., 1987), cigarettes (Zinser et al., 1992), cocaine (Powell, Bradley, & 
Gray, 1992), and food (McDiarmid & Hethrington, 1995). In a context of externally attributed 
deprivation, the predominant emotion is often frustration or anger (Sherman, Morse, & Baker, 
1986). Within the EI theory, this effect is linked to a heightened sense of deprivation. 
The association between craving and negative emotion during behavioral restraint is usually 
characterized by anxiety (Monti et al., 1993) or guilt (Cooney et al., 1987; McDiarmid & 
Hethrington, 1995), although more complex mixtures of negative emotions may also be seen 
(Powell et al., 1992). Anxiety over craving during an attempt at restraint shows some similarity to a 
“goal violation effect” (Marlatt & Gordon, 1985) within lapses in behavior control: It is as if the 
person sees imagined consumption as tantamount to a behavioral violation. The anxiety appears 
related to an expected difficulty in maintaining future restraint (Bandura, 1986; Marlatt & Gordon, 
1985). The negative emotion is not simply an increased awareness of deprivation but involves an 
attribution of the desire to poor control (e.g., “I must still be hooked on it if I still feel this way: I’m 
in danger of losing control”). There is sound empirical evidence to support the idea that such 
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interpretations—far from being epiphenomenal to behavioral control—are powerful influences on 
addictive behavior (Bandura, 1982; Sitharthan & Kavanagh, 1990). 
Physiological arousal. Subjective ratings of desires are loosely linked with physiological arousal 
(Cepeda-Benito & Tiffany, 1996; Cooney et al., 1997; Kaplan et al., 1985), with weak or 
nonsignificant associations often being observed (Drobes & Tiffany, 1997; Maude-Griffin & 
Tiffany, 1996; Tiffany & Hakenewerth, 1991). We argue that these results do not pose significant 
problems for the EI theory. Psychophysiological data such as increased heart rate are often 
ambiguous, potentially confusing activation from desires with preparation for action (Sayette et al., 
2000), activation from concurrent tasks (Maude-Griffin & Tiffany, 1996), or anxiety (e.g., about 
potential loss of control; McCusker & Brown, 1991). Desires that involved more vivid sensory 
images might be expected within EI theory to have a closer relationship with physiological 
responses than would desires with less imaginal involvement. However, such an increased 
association would be expected only with physiological responses in closely related domains (e.g., 
perhaps between gustatory imagery and salivation). A close correspondence between 
psychophysiological arousal responses and subjective desire is not predicted by the theory, except 
where there is an awareness of both the psychophysiological response and its association with the 
appetitive target. Furthermore as already argued, the EI theory predicts that an initial positive 
response to the elaboration or intrusion is followed by an awareness of deficit and negative affect, 
so that a complex emotional response should occur. It also predicts that the speed and degree of the 
different reactions would vary, depending on the strength of associations to each affective response 
(based on the individual’s learning history and the presence of neural sensitization or adaptation) 
and depending on the affective context (including the degree to which positive and negative aspects 
of target acquisition were primed). Averaging over episodes or individuals would obscure any such 
irregular patterns. 
Just as we find difficulty interpreting the meaning of physiological arousal that accompanies desire, 
so it is likely that people experiencing desire have this problem as well. Arousal in response to 
desire may be thought to be anxiety or vice versa. We discussed evidence supporting misattribution 
of arousal above in the context of physiological responses being a trigger for desire. The issue also 
applies to the assessment of desire, which may be affected by whatever affective cues are salient at 
the time. Such measurement bias would have the effect of reducing any true association between 
desire and arousal (or, indeed, between desire and later behavior). 
Lack of concordance is not of course restricted to desire. Rather, as Drummond (2000) pointed out, 
it is a hallmark of emotional reactions (Lang, 1979; Rankin, Hodgson, & Stockwell, 1979). 
Desynchrony among psychophysiological responses, subjective reports, and behavior was identified 
more than 20 years ago by Lang (1979), who developed a bioinformational model of emotion to 
explain the phenomenon. Part of the reason for desynchrony is that there are substantial individual 
differences in the patterning of arousal and in the information that is used to identify emotion. The 
desynchrony between response domains in craving and emotion highlights the affective nature of 
desire (Sayette et al., 2000) and the multiple components of the reward and relief reactions that 
accompany it. As in other emotional reactions, psychophysiological responses inform the subjective 
emotional experience of desire, but they do not constitute it. 
Effects of expected delay. A recent study by Sayette et al. (2003) confirmed that even very short 
delays can be associated with different affective correlates of desires. In Experiment 2, smokers 
who were told that they could smoke within 15 s were more likely to show positive facial 
expressions than did smokers who were told that there would be a 60 s delay. An apparent trend to 
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more negative expressions in the longer delay conditions did not reach statistical significance in this 
sample. 
In summary, the evidence on affect is consistent with our proposal that desire involves both positive 
and negative emotions. Animal research in motivation over the last 15 years potentially challenges 
this view. Essentially, this research suggests that drug use is driven by appetitive processes distinct 
from those that underpin feelings of pleasure. A range of psychoactive substances tend to result in 
reduced hedonic pleasure with repeated use (an aspect of tolerance), combined with increased 
sensitization of dopaminergic systems related to reward. This incentive sensitization is supported by 
examination of neural sensitization directly and by the effects of repeated drug use on learning and 
performance. For example, sensitization increases the speed with which rats learn how and where to 
acquire a drug (see Robinson & Berridge, 2003). Observations such as dissociations between liking 
for particular tastes and appetite for them (e.g., Berridge, Venier, & Robinson, 1989) led Robinson 
and Berridge (1993) to argue that liking or hedonic pleasure associated with reward should be 
distinguished from reward processes related to wanting or incentive salience. A distinction of the 
neural substrates underpinning hedonic processes from those related to incentive salience suggests 
that with repeated administrations of psychoactive drugs, the hedonic aspects of reward may 
become less important in driving continued elaboration of the desire than other pathways involved 
in reward. 
We posit that a separation of hedonic and incentive salience aspects of reward does not challenge 
our position on the affective responses typically related to desires and does not exclude influences 
between hedonic responses and incentive salience. Although, as Robinson and Berridge (2003) have 
shown, unconscious wanting is a key mechanism underpinning motivated drug use, we argue that 
conscious positive affect is also important in the subjective experience of desire. In particular, the 
inclusion of pleasure or relief in the EI model as a proximal effect of desire-related cognition helps 
to explain why desire persists even though it is ultimately an aversive experience when deprivation 
is high and target acquisition is expected to be delayed or thwarted. We predict that cognitions 
about substance use, and particularly sensory images, will continue to elicit some immediate sense 
of pleasure or relief even in the context of repeated use or entrenched substance dependence and 
that this affective reaction rewards attention to and elaboration of the desire cognition. The repeated 
use of psychoactive substances results in a movement from a focus on pleasure to an increasing role 
for relief, and the subsequent sense of deprivation is amplified, leading to an increased ambivalence 
in the affective response. However, affective connotations to the cognition remain. 
Desire Is One of Many Factors That Influence Target Acquisition and Consumption 
Target acquisition behaviors and desire have mutual influences in the EI theory. Controlled 
processing of responses increases explicit desire and is itself maintained by desire. When target 
acquisition is being planned and directed, the process provides further information to elaborate the 
desire, and conversely the elaboration of desires often retrieves information that is relevant to 
response planning and direction. So, an exhausted traveler may elaborate a desire image that 
involves stopping at a nearby hotel and retiring to a soft bed. The reinforcing nature of the thought 
provides salient incentive information. However the construction of an elaborated, episodic image 
may also incorporate procedural information such as the route that can be taken to the hotel or how 
a reservation may be obtained. Of course, not all desire-related thoughts include response 
information, and some information that is generated in response direction may be incompatible with 
the desire (e.g., the cost of the room). 
Popular conceptions of desire give it a central place in the development of excessive consumption 
(Jellinek, 1960). EI theory sees desire as only one of many factors in the determination of target 
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acquisition (cf. Tiffany, 1990), and it identifies several limitations to behavioral predictions from 
subjective desire reports. One limit to the predictive ability of desire is the way in which it is 
assessed. Although desire in the EI theory is a conscious cognitive event and therefore available to 
introspective judgment, assessment of desire requires accurate recollection of events that are 
variable in affective intensity and are sometimes fleeting. If the person is asked to make a single 
intensity rating about desires that occurred over periods as long as a week, the ratings are likely to 
be influenced by a range of biases including the salience of each desire episode and beliefs about 
the desire. Even if the global measure of desires or urges relates to a testing session, limits to the 
relationship with behaviors such as reaction times will be seen at specific test points (Cepeda-
Benito & Tiffany, 1996), unless the level of desire is relatively constant. Attempts to predict 
consumption levels in the natural environment from desires that are assessed in a clinic or 
laboratory will also be weak (Rohsenow et al., 1994), unless the desires are particularly insensitive 
to both time and context (cf.Mischel, 1968). Reports are also potentially subject to self-presentation, 
especially if they are collected in a clinic setting (e.g., Stormark et al., 1995). Individual differences 
in these effects would impair the ability of desires to predict subsequent behavior. 
An underestimation of predictive relationships may also result from a reliance on measures of desire 
intensity (Tiffany, Carter, & Singleton, 2000; Tiffany & Drobes, 1991; cf. Monti, Rohsenow, & 
Hutchison, 2000). We argue that desires vary not only in affective intensity and salience but also in 
frequency and duration. The time course of desire may sometimes be more important than its 
intensity at one point in time. Shiffman et al. (1997) found that duration of temptations to smoke on 
the “quit day” were strongly related to subsequent lapses and that lapses were preceded by linear 
increases in waking urges to smoke over the previous 3 days. Maintaining control in the face of 
sustained periods of high desire may present particularly demanding challenges. 
A pathway to behavior through elaboration provides several ways in which the desire may not lead 
to an associated response, even when it is very strong. This aspect of the EI theory incorporates 
several social–cognitive elements (Bandura, 1986; Monti et al., 2000). First, we predict that the 
linkage to responses may be moderated by attention diversion. Because the response direction is 
dependent on limited working memory resources, if another cognitive task captures these resources, 
the response preparation will be interrupted (unless of course there are strong associative response 
links that can take over). Second, the operation of the desire occurs in the presence of other 
potential incentives. So, the tired traveler may continue home, with the prospect of a loved one 
waiting at home being sufficient to overcome the wish to stop at the hotel. Some of these 
considerations may involve disincentives—for example, the traveler’s boss may be annoyed by the 
excuse of staying at the hotel. Third, the target may be thought to be difficult to achieve with the 
resources and skills that can be brought to bear. The tired traveler may not be sure of finding the 
hotel. In consequence of these other factors, the focus of response-related cognition may become 
the inhibition of the immediate response to the desire (taking the hotel exit) or engagement in 
incompatible activity (e.g., selecting a faster way to travel home). 
Factors influencing explicit control of responses are not simply nuisance variables, muddying the 
power of desires to predict and determine behavior. The potential for competing incentives and for 
control of responses is a source of liberation, providing people with the power to select and control 
behavior, even in the face of strong desires (Bandura, 1999). High-risk situations can be predicted 
and avoided (Marlatt & Gordon, 1985), and coping strategies for them can be acquired and applied. 
Social assistance can be obtained to make behavioral inhibition easier. A search for successful past 
control can be initiated, so that self-efficacy is maximized. Disincentives for consumption and 
incentives for control can be elicited, including self-incentives. The desires themselves can be 
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preempted, and their nature and duration can be modified. These variables provide opportunities for 
self-regulation and for effective treatment. 
The relationship between desire and behavior is modulated in complex ways by mood. Negative 
mood contributes directly to desire by accentuating the sense of target deficit and amplifies 
incentives for behavior that is expected to relieve the deficit. It also influences behavior through 
effects on self-efficacy. Negative mood impairs self-efficacy for target acquisition if there is any 
room for doubt (potentiating perceptions of high task difficulty and poor past achievement; 
Kavanagh, 1992; Kavanagh & Bower, 1985), but the impact on self-efficacy is even greater in 
behavior control because of the variability that typically exists in control achievements. The person 
will often see themselves as unable to inhibit target acquisition when they are feeling low 
(Kavanagh, 1992; Marlatt & Gordon, 1985). 
Target acquisition may also occur without a high level of explicit desire. When the target is highly 
available and there are no significant disincentives for acquisition, it may take very little desire to 
initiate action (e.g., accepting a free drink on an aircraft). In the EI theory, target acquisition may 
also occur when associative processes trigger behavior with little cognitive elaboration. Associative 
processes may create decisional biases that indirectly result in acquisition becoming more likely. 
The notion that processes underlying response selection may operate outside awareness, through 
decisional biases, is not a new one (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; Zajonc, 
1980). The EI theory does not assume introspective access to any of the cognitive processes it 
describes—only to the products of those processes. So, if an associative link has previously been 
established between a desired activity such as drinking and a particular route that passes a bar, it 
may sometimes be the preference for the route that is consciously experienced rather than an 
explicit desire for alcohol (cf. the notion of “apparently irrelevant decisions”; Marlatt & Gordon, 
1985). Once in the context where the target is highly available or other incentive processes (e.g., 
social reinforcers) become operative, target acquisition may then occur even if the current explicit 
desire for alcohol is not particularly high. 
EI theory predicts that an effect of decisional biases on behavior without any conscious desire for 
the target will be the exception rather than the rule. The EI theory posits that associative processes 
that trigger decisional biases also trigger intrusive thoughts. Therefore we predict that when a 
biased retrieval of response-related information does occur, it will typically be preceded by a 
transitory intrusive thought about the target. The person may not be fully aware that their decision is 
related to the fleeting thought, but they were aware of the thought at the time. 
An associative link from stimulus cues to overlearned, automatized action schemata may also result 
in some acquisition behaviors (Tiffany, 1990). This idea has some plausibility when consumption in 
substance dependence is closely observed (Nil, Buzzi, & Bättig, 1984). A familiar example is a 
person lighting a cigarette when they already have one in an ashtray or even in their mouth. 
However, although complex response chaining can become automatic with repetition (driving a car 
is a familiar example), we predict that the effect of automatized action schemata will typically be 
restricted to simple behaviors (such as reaching for a cookie or lighting a cigarette) and to situations 
in which the appetitive target is readily available and attention is gripped by a concurrent task (such 
as reading this article). As Tiffany (1990) pointed out, absentminded lapses of this kind during a 
control attempt can be seen as a type of action slip that has been extensively studied in other 
domains (Norman, 1981). One reason for a restricted role for automatized responses is the same as 
in decisional biases: Elements of a complex response chain each have the potential to elicit 
associated intrusive thoughts about the target, at which point the process becomes explicit, and 
target acquisition is either inhibited or consciously pursued. A further reason is that minor changes 
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in the behavioral requirements almost always require controlled processing at some time during a 
response chain because minor variations of performance will be required on different occasions 
(e.g., the cigarette lighter is in a different place). Although we may well have another set of highly 
practiced skills we can bring into play to deal with the new situation, their selection requires 
controlled processing. 
We therefore argue that the prototypical situation is that behavior is consciously directed. Conscious 
direction of target acquisition is initiated by and contributes to desire. When associative links 
trigger intrusive thoughts, the momentary awareness of desire results in conscious response 
direction, even when the component behaviors remain simple and well practiced. Target acquisition 
in the absence of desire represents an accidental lapse of control rather than the norm. 
Predictive association. The presence of a relationship between desires and related behavior is 
supported by links between heightened craving and subsequent relapses in addictive disorders 
(Swan, Ward, & Jack, 1996). For example, Killen and Fortmann (1997) found highly significant 
relationships between high levels of craving by 2,600 former smokers and their relapse over the 
following 12 months. The relative increase in risk of relapse from high craving was substantial 
(2.18 for men and 1.60 for women). Laboratory studies also show an association between craving 
and work to obtain the substance, especially in situations in which reported craving is highly salient 
(Ludwig & Wikler, 1974). 
The importance of thoughts about the target is illustrated by data on delay of gratification. One 
research paradigm involved giving children a choice between a small but immediate reward and a 
delayed and more substantial one (Mischel, Ebbeson, & Raskoff-Zeiss, 1972). If children attended 
to the desirable qualities of the delayed reward, they waited for shorter periods of time than when 
they were distracted from these thoughts (Mischel & Ebbeson, 1970; Mischel et al., 1972; 
Rodriguez, Mischel, & Shoda, 1989). Such findings support the generality of causal relationships 
between a preoccupation with consummatory thoughts and subsequent consumption. 
Also consistent with the EI theory is that the correlations between subjective craving and 
subsequent consumption are often relatively weak (Tiffany, 1990, 1999; Weiss, Griffin, & Hufford, 
1995). Although such results are often subject to the assessment problems discussed above, the 
evidence shows that desire does not have a univariate, causal relationship with related behavior. Not 
all consumption is related to high levels of desire, and high levels of desire do not necessarily lead 
to consumption (Kranzler, Mulgrew, Modesto-Lowe, & Burleson, 1999; Tiffany, 1990). 
Associative pathway to target acquisition. Substance-related memory associations, an index of 
cognitive availability, have been shown to predict later consumption of both alcohol and marijuana 
(Stacy, 1997). Their predictive contribution is more powerful than substance expectancies and 
remains after previous consumption level is controlled. However, it is not clear which processes 
drive this predictive link—for example, the data are consistent with effects of intrusive thoughts on 
automatized responses, effects on retrieval of response information, or effects operating through 
conscious elaborative processes. 
Neuroanatomical data. The idea that there may be separable influences from automatic and 
controlled aspects of desire on substance use gains some added credence from an elegant series of 
neuroanatomical studies by Bechara, Damasio, and Damasio (2000) on decision making. These 
studies have separated effects of frontal areas underpinning the situational reexperiencing of 
emotions (including the ventromedial orbitofrontal cortex [VM]) from ones implicated in working 
memory (including dorsolateral prefrontal areas). The studies rely on the effects of VM injury on 
the ability to learn appetitive event probabilities and make associated decisions. They suggest that 
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working memory relating to emotional consequences can be intact despite VM injury but that 
reexperiencing of the emotional reaction from memories of events is impaired by this injury. 
Optimally functional decision making requires both intact working memory and intact emotional 
associations. 
This research is consistent with desire being an interplay between cognition and emotional–
motivational systems and suggests that this interplay is a general feature of target acquisition and 
consumption. The work is also consistent with our suggestion that there is both an automatic and a 
controlled influence of desires on substance use, and the existence of two neuroanatomical 
pathways that appear to influence motivational decisions makes it conceivable that partial 
dissociation of the processes may sometimes occur (e.g., as previously argued, under situations of 
high competitive working memory load). It is not yet clear how the processes identified by Bechara 
et al. (2000) relate to our distinction between associative and elaborative processes. 
Multiple determinants of consumption. Consistent with our contention, a limiting factor on the 
predictive effect of a specific desire on subsequent behavior is the moderation of its influence by 
competing incentives (Covington & Omelich, 1992). Desires focus on immediate reinforcement 
from the behavior (Powell et al., 1992). The desire would not occur if proximal negative 
consequences predominated (e.g., “I’ll be sick if I eat another chocolate”). However, negative 
expectancies for the behavior (or positive expectancies for control) can also influence consumption 
(Breiner, Stritzke, & Lang, 1999). There are individual differences in the extent that negative 
expectancies are elicited in temptation situations (Avants, Margolin, Kosten, & Cooney, 1995), and 
increasing the salience and perceived relevance of inhibitory factors is an important therapeutic 
procedure in the reduction of substance misuse (Miller & Rollnick, 1991). Even the drinking of 
people with severe alcohol dependence can be moderated in the short term by introducing sufficient 
external rewards for control (Cohen, Liebson, Faillace, & Allen, 1971; Griffiths, Bigelow, & 
Liebson, 1977). 
There is also substantial evidence in favor of behavioral influence from other social–cognitive 
variables (Bandura, 1986, 1999). The mastery of relevant skills in target acquisition or behavioral 
control (Bliss, Garvey, & Ward, 1999; Litman, Stapleton, Oppenheim, Peleg, & Jackson, 1984; 
Shiffman, Paty, Gnys, Kassel, & Hickcox, 1996) and the degree of related self-efficacy (Kavanagh, 
Pierce, Lo, & Shelley, 1993; Niaura, 2000; Sitharthan & Kavanagh, 1990) are particularly 
important factors. Situational difficulty also is important: This includes the availability of the 
appetitive target and possibility of consumption (Palij et al., 1996; Shiffman et al., 1996). When 
considering behavioral inhibition, it involves the situational difficulty in resisting consumption 
(Shiffman et al., 1996) and presence of response aids. 
If there is nothing to inhibit consumption and the relevant object is readily available, consumption 
may occur at very low levels of desire. Conversely, consumption can be controlled even when 
craving is high, provided other variables favor restraint (Sitharthan, Sitharthan, Hough, & 
Kavanagh, 1997). This is consistent with the contention in the EI theory that desire is a factor 
affecting subsequent behavior, but that it is only one among many. 
Summary of the Current Empirical Status of EI Theory 
We began work on the EI theory partly in an attempt to integrate the evidence on craving and place 
it in the wider context of cognitive–emotional mechanisms of motivation and desire. The theory is 
highly consistent with both the evidence prior to 1999, when we began this work, and data that have 
emerged since that time. The empirical support includes data from proximal self-reports, but the 
potential for error in subjective judgments is explicated. 
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There is particularly well-documented evidence for the input and output components of the theory, 
that is, for factors that elicit desire and for the consequences of desire for behavior. A large body of 
data supports the view that conditioned cues, anticipatory responses, and negative affect trigger 
craving and that consumption is modulated by factors such as self-efficacy as well as by craving 
strength. Ongoing contention focuses on the extent that controlled response direction rather than 
decisional biases influences target acquisition and on the idea that biased decision making is 
typically preceded by conscious desire. The affective nature of desire is also well documented, 
although there is some contention over the extent to which affective responses drive attentional 
allocation to the target. 
The distinction between intrusive thoughts and cognitive elaboration in craving is supported by data 
on the availability of target-related information and on the failure of attempted thought suppression 
as well as by self-reports of transient intrusive thoughts. Elaborated thoughts, resulting from 
directed search and retention of target-related information, are indicated by interference between 
desire-related ruminations and concurrent cognitive tasks and by data on instructed instigation of 
appetitive ruminations. The focus of the EI theory on the role of imagery is highly consistent with a 
range of data including evidence on the efficacy of imagery in eliciting desire, recent findings that 
visual imagery is particularly effective at reducing craving (K. Harvey et al., in press; Panabokke et 
al., under review), and self-reports of appetitive imagery during craving. 
The balance of current evidence suggests that conscious desires are not merely epiphenomenal. 
They play an active role in the determination of target acquisition, albeit one that is modulated by 
many other factors. They directly affect cognition. Even when desires do not lead to related 
behavior, their occurrence can have functional impact. During desire episodes, the person will 
appear absentminded or lose concentration. This in itself could have important consequences on 
both work performance and leisure activities. In cases in which the desire is associated with an 
intense awareness of deficit, it would also reduce the pleasure obtained from other activities. These 
effects of desires may often be much more important than their influence on target acquisition, 
especially when that behavior is functional. 
Predictions of the EI Theory 
Although the EI theory provides a good fit with existing evidence, a true test of the theory requires 
that it be able to make predictions about new directions for research. Some recent findings from our 
own laboratories that have been inspired by the theory have been presented throughout the article, 
as have some specific predictions that can be investigated. Further tests of the theory could focus, 
inter alia, on the issues detailed below. 
1. Automatic and elaborative processes in craving can be distinguished. Because this postulate is 
central to our theory, each of the following predictions are critical to it: 
Unelaborated intrusive desire thoughts will occur on some occasions without being further 
elaborated. Although this is expected to be more common when deprivation is low or the target is 
not highly valued, there will also be at least some intrusions at times of higher deprivation, when 
concurrent cognitive activity impairs elaboration of the desire-related cognition. 
Differential brain activation will be associated with unelaborated intrusive thoughts and elaboration. 
Attempted suppression will increase the availability of desire-related information during the 
suppression task or immediately subsequent to it. Replication of the effects observed in the small 
number of studies on the matter to date is required. These observations would demonstrate a linkage 
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between desires and other research on intrusive cognition. Effects will still be present even when 
elaboration is inhibited by the presence of a competing task. 
Attempted suppression of intrusive thoughts will lead to similar brain activation as in OCD because 
of close apparent parallels between the phenomena of thought suppression in craving and OCD. A 
similarity between orbitofrontal activation in desires and in OCD has previously been observed. Our 
view is that this effect will be particularly marked when an attempt is made to suppress the intrusive 
thought. 
2. Our contention that desires typically involve sensory images is the most novel aspect of our 
theory, although the central model (as illustrated in Figure 1) does not stand or fall on this point 
because desire-related propositional representations could still elicit pleasure or relief and 
attentional allocation. Our assertion about the importance of imagery would imply the following: 
Desires will show similar brain activation to that seen in imagery. Although existing brain 
activation data are consistent with this prediction, these studies have typically used imagery to 
evoke the desire. Research is needed in naturally occurring desire episodes in which imagery is not 
evoked instructionally. 
Mutual competition will be seen between desire imagery and modality-specific concurrent tasks. 
Although we have already gathered some evidence on the effects of other imagery in suppressing 
desire, further research is needed to confirm our prediction of greater interference from competing 
tasks that require similar working memory resources then from those that do not. 
Episodes of desire with more vivid sensory images will be rated as stronger in intensity. 
3. While EI theory acknowledges that target acquisition can represent a learned behavior that need 
not be preceded by desire on every occasion, the theory asserts that changes in desires are involved 
in the causation of changes in target acquisition rather than being epiphenomenal. An appropriate 
test of this prediction requires that the measure of desire is proximal and sensitive and that other 
potential causal factors (i.e., competing incentives, target availability, and relevant skills) are 
controlled. Most current tests of behavioral predictions from desires do not meet these criteria. 
Treatment Implications 
The EI theory also has potential implications for treatment of addictive problems (see Kavanagh, 
Andrade, & May, 2004). We do not propose these treatment implications as providing a powerful 
test of the theory because it is difficult to control all relevant factors in even the best-designed 
clinical trial. To the extent that existing treatment already improves control skills sufficiently, there 
is also a potential for ceiling effects in behavioral outcomes and for a habituation of craving to 
environmental cues in the natural environment. 
Existing psychological interventions already incorporate some elements that would be expected 
from EI theory to assist with craving. For example, the prediction and avoidance of high-risk 
situations for behavioral lapses (Chaney, O’Leary, & Marlatt, 1978) are likely to reduce the risk not 
only of relapse but also of intense desire. A cognitive approach may well examine the accuracy of 
overly positive expectancies from the addictive behavior or address secondary dysphoria about 
craving, among other cognitive targets (cf. Beck, Wright, Newman, & Liese, 1993). However, the 
application of other aspects of EI theory should further increase the effectiveness of existing 
psychological treatment for control of craving and its effects. These include the following: 
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For instigation of the desire: The identification of dysphoria and periods of nontarget deprivation as 
risks for desire elicitation; reattribution of desire during those states to other deprivation; and 
application of problem solving and response plans to prevent or address irrelevant deprivation. 
For dysfunctional coping strategies: In vivo demonstration of the ineffectiveness of thought 
suppression and promotion of accepting and letting go of the desire-related thoughts (e.g., in 
mindfulness meditation; cf. Breslin, Zack, & McKain, 2002; Teasdale et al., 2000). 
For functional coping: Once an understanding of accept and let go is achieved, the application of 
competing imagery or other tasks with high working memory load to deal with elaboration. 
Conclusion 
We propose a comprehensive theory of desire that does not view it as an epiphenomenon but also 
avoids an assertion that it is the sole determinant of target acquisition. The theory attempts to 
describe and explain the processes underpinning a variety of desires, including those for 
psychoactive substances. It incorporates both automatic or associative processes underpinning the 
subjective phenomenon of intrusive desire-related thoughts as well as more controlled processes of 
elaboration. It encompasses a phenomenon that offers an imaginary relish that enchants our senses 
but also can represent an exquisite torture like that experienced by the legendary Tantalus. The 
relish seduces us into successive elaborations of the desire, but the piquancy of this relish also 
amplifies a sense of deprivation and torture when the target cannot immediately be obtained. Our 
theory emphasizes the role of sensory images and anticipatory responses in desire cognition and 
particularly the potential of these sensory experiences to elicit strong affective reactions. It predicts 
not only that episodes of desire may interfere with other tasks but also that appropriately designed 
tasks may avert or halt the episode. The theory offers a rich source for programs of research in 
desire that may further elucidate the phenomenon. 
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Footnotes 
1We do not speculate on the precise nature of desire-related cognition in animals, except to say that 
we expect the differences to relate primarily to the extent of elaboration and associated 
metacognitions rather than to the essential nature of the related attentional salience or affective 
response. 
2The level of affective reaction that is needed before elaboration is triggered cannot be precisely 
specified a priori. Average levels of experimental manipulations such as deprivation durations may 
be derived empirically, but their impact will remain probabilistic. 
3Compare Robinson and Berridge’s (2003) distinction between liking and wanting, but note that we 
are talking about the conscious affective and cognitive experiences that constitute desire, whereas, 
at least in later expositions of their theory, Robinson and Berridge used liking and wanting to 
denote implicit underpinnings of desire. 
Figure 1. The elaborated intrusion theory of desire. The central box contains the subjective 
components of desire. Rounded external boxes represent antecedents or external factors, and 
rectangular internal boxes are the products of automatic and elaborative processing, indicated by 
arrows. Automatic components of desire (thin arrows) lead to apparently spontaneous thoughts that 
are perceived as intrusive. An elaborative cycle (thick arrows) encompasses the cognitive processes 
involved in retrieval of semantic, episodic, and sensory information from long-term memory and 
the use of that information to construct quasi-lifelike images of the desired target. Elaborative 
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processing also increases the immediate likelihood of further activation of antecedents, through 
attentional changes and working memory prioritization (not indicated in the figure). Substance 
dependence increases the longer term likelihood of the activation of antecedents, through 
phenomena such as incentive sensitization (Robinson & Berridge, 1993). Although the immediate 
affective consequences of desire related imagery are positive, an increasing sense of associated 
deficit feeds back to negative affect. 
 
 
